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Land in India is problematic largely because of archaic and perverse provisions in the 
practice and the law. The new Land Acquisition Amendment Bill does go some way 
to correct the anti-democratic and imperial provisions of the old 1894 Act. Other 
regulatory restraints stand in the way of fair compensation to sellers whether the deal 
is a sale or an acquisition using eminent domain.  Urban planning being based on the 
“Ricardian Model” and on top of  asymmetrically applied regulatory constraints further 
depresses the benefit to land owners. As a result very little land is obtainable without 
dispute and high risk for infrastructure development. In this paper we provide an 
analytical critique of the law and restrictions as also of the framework of urban 
planning and provide a justification for why major change is required in the approach 
to land markets, land acquisition and urban planning. We also provide the key 
elements of a reformed approach that can create a win-win framework for 
development. We also present our suggestions on how the proposed Amendment to 
the Land Acquisition Act can be changed to make the Act functional and remove the 
residual perversities therein. 
 
 
                                                  
1 A version of this paper is slated to appear in a volume on infrastructure proposed to be 
brought out by Business Standard and edited by Rajiv Lall,  Managing Director, IDFC. 
2 Professors at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.  
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The Question of Land and Infrastructure Development in India: Urgently 





Land acquisition takes place both through the markets, and by use of eminent 
domain when the state choses to use this route to compulsorily acquire land. Both 
have been highly problematic in India largely on account of inadequacies in the law. 
Further more regulations related to land use, and the process and assumptions of 
urban planning have led the exclusion of the poor in the benefits of infrastructural 
development
3. Even the middle classes are able to participate only by parting with 
vast sums of money as when they buy housing, a large part of which is merely 
transfer payments arising on account of improper urban planning, highly distortionary 
restrictions, heavy taxes, poor laws, improper adherence to property rights, and the 
cost of overcoming these restrictions through a process that is hardly entirely legal. 
Ignorance of these problems raises the cost especially of urban infrastructure. They 
also impose very large punishment on those who are the victims of the use of 
eminent domain. Only by change that is informed by an economic logic, is fair and 
practical, and when property rights are adhered to, can we move forward. The 
current distortions have compounding effects and infrastructure constructed without 
correcting these would be very expensive, exclude many and would continue to be a 
drag on development. 
 
LAND MARKETS AND USE RESTRICTIONS 
 
Land markets themselves are subject to “market failure”. It is important to understand 
the nature of the failure here so that the existing land use restrictions, regulations, 
permissions etc, can be critically understood, since in a situation of change “what 
exists” need not necessarily be the optimal
4.   
 
There are three core failures in the market for land: (1) The use of land in can have 
external effects on the value of adjoining parcels of land. Thus use of land for an 
industry (even when all pollution control is in place) can reduce the value of land in 
use for residences close by.  And at higher levels of income the value of land in 
residential use can be reduced considerably even in commercial use of adjoining 
parcels. This is the core reason for town planning and restrictions/regulation on land 
use emanating from the same. Yet land use also has vast positive externalities as 
                                                  
3 Morris, Sebastian (2001). 
4 Morris, Sebastian and Ajay Pandey (2007)  
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when the use of land in a concentrated way can enhance the value jointly. This 
economies of agglomeration and joint use is another reason for the price 
appreciation in land, and the ability fo land to generate differential rents even when 
there is no overall scarcity.   
 
Central place allocation in a market arising from such positive externalities underlie 
the distribution of rents and (hence of) activities in central places. Central places, 
when the market is allowed to do so, allocates the most centrally located land to the 
highest rent payers – typically large national and international firms with much value 
creation - followed by rich residencies and life style markets, followed in turn by other 
residences and markets and lastly at the periphery by industrial and intense 
agricultural activities. When planning seeks to more rationally (than what the market 
would) allocate the land use, the probability of error is likely to very large since very 
large positive externalities in land use that the market has a tendency to bring about 
can be negated, even as the negative externalities are possibly avoided. (2) The hold 
out problem results in a kind of market failure. Aggregation incentives are lowered 
since it is always possible for an individual plot holder to hold out against an 
aggregator to garner a larger part of the value increase in aggregation that a 
developer hopes for. Therefore the business of aggregation (and disaggregation) 
essential for land market and for changing use is adversely affected. One visible 
result of the same is the observation that modern supermarkets requiring larger 
parcels of land have low chances of acquiring such land through aggregation, and so 
locate sub optimally in the periphery, creating in unnecessary travel and higher need 
for private transport.  And thereby they reduce the overall efficiency of the city as an 
economic engine.  
 
THE PROBLEM WITH CITY PLANNERS (IN INDIA) 
 
Unfortunately city planners have not always had an economic approach to planning 
and land use. Being driven by the profession of architects this is one area that has 
missed the liberalising reform of the late 20
th century. Nineteenth century 
urbanisation especially in the US which was based more on common sense and 
collective choices made by the founding fathers of cities, and was liberal while 
avoiding the immediate negative externalities through rules of location, gave the 
country its vast and highly functional cities.  This has allowed the US to not only be a 
very efficient economy but also to provide for ample housing and real estate for 
nearly all its citizens. Indeed, the average available built up space for the working 
class in cities in the US is higher than what is available even to senior mangers in  
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cities like Tokyo and in the more traditional European cities with their problems 
arising from legacy. 
 
The UK after much functional growth (some would call unplanned) had in the 20
th 
century entered into the straight jacket of urban planning and plan based restrictions, 
that still awaits reform.  This has made housing costs significantly  higher than in 
Europe and very high in relation to the US
5.  At the core of the problem has been the 
planner’s assumption that the Ricardian Model of rent is the appropriate one to go by 
in planning and in imposition of use restrictions. Planners have typically assumed 
that land has no alternative use (this is true if upfront the legal/regulatory restriction is 
accepted), and hence would derive the rents in land as emanating from the demand 
for housing. Thus they would consider  the high prices of housing to be entirely a 
function of demand and not because of their own planning imposed land use 
restrictions or regulatory restraints on use of land for housing.  This tautological 
position was apparently held at the highest levels among planners and apparently 
still continues to be, to restrict housing supplies and maintain high prices
6.  
 
THE PROBLEM IN A MODEL 
 
The incorrectness of the position is easy to see by considering the alternative use of 
land. Land can potentially be used for housing, agriculture, as park land, industry 
besides commercial and public use (roads, ports etc and in network industries with 
considerable specific land requirement). How much is available for each in a situation 
where the market allocates depends upon the rent gradient in use. Thus if we 
consider a simple model of land use in either agriculture or  in housing which is the 
typical situation that obtains  in the periphery of a central place, then the boundary is 
entirely determined by the growth of the city and the rents that arise in the alternative 
activities. Thus consider  demand for land derived from the demand for housing as 
represented by HH in Exhibit
1.  Similarly, the demand for land for agriculture is 
derived from the demand for agriculture, where agriculture is carried out 
commercially.  The total land available for the two uses together is OO’. Since there 
are very large agglomeration economies and central place value in housing, and the 
demand for housing is price inelastic the slope of HH is much larger than the slope of 
AA.  When the market is allowed to allocate the house prices are determined from 
Rm, and the market allocates  OHm amount of land for housing and OO’-OHm for 
agriculture. As housing demand increases more is automatically allocated by the 
                                                  
5 Barker, Kate (2006) 
6 Evans, Alan (2004)  
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market. With planners releasing less land than OHm (i.e. OHp) under the idea that 
parks/agriculral activities at the periphery needs to be protected etc,  the land 
available being less there is a sharp rise in house prices and rents in land as is easily 
evident.  This creates vast transfer losses to house purchases in favour of landlords. 
It also creates dead weight losses on society which is the area of the shaded triangle. 
And the single most important reason for the high prices of housing in the UK for 
emanates therein.   Many planners have been quite insensitive to the costs their 
regulations impose. Indeed they have rarely been aware that they impose such 
costs, forget about any method or a process to measure and assess such costs and 
weigh them against the benefits that planning provides. Some (sensitive planners) 
would in planning with such land restrictions allow higher densities so that the HH 
curve itself is lowered. Then it would be consistent with the philosophy of higher 
concentrations of urban housing and use of public rather than private transport.  The 
point to recognise is the planning can impose very large costs and there are no 
simple processes or tools available with the town planner to measure or assess 
these costs. The profession as such is wanting having been caught in a tradition of 
architectural and landscape approach to city planning. When planners underscore 
their restrictions and are informed by an appreciation of the organic nature of a city, 
and recognise the key reason for the city – the access to each other- resulting in high 
value to central places, then they would do better
7.  
 
Urban planning in India is doubly constrained by very little formal release of 
agricultural land. The master plan process being highly contentious and participation 
ritualised, most planning that necessarily involves changes in land use puts vast 
rents into the hands of politicians, favoured landowners and civil servants who know 
the master plans even before they are formulated and can therefore take speculative 
positions on land. Thus the value of land at the periphery given the restrictions can 
change significantly from (<=)Rm to Rp. If master plans do not have to generate these 
rents to advance information the they will have to work on the principle of mimicking 
the market in so far as the total land allocation to the superior land use is concerned. 
Small restrictions would have to be balanced by higher overall intensity of land use in 
housing which would be justified for building the economics of public transportation 
especially in metros that need high corridor densities to be socially viable. Only then 
can the avoidance of negative externalities in land use – the cleaner and greater 
separation of various uses – be justified.  
 
                                                  
7 This analysis is an extension of Evans, Alan (2004).  
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Additionally in India since the urban planner operates with vastly lower FSIs than 
what the market would have picked, the costs of planning are bound to be very much 
larger than the small benefits arising from the avoidance of negative externalities. 
Witness that if the demand curve for housing is HH(India) rather than HH on account 
of the upfront very low floor space indices (FSIs) in housing then the rents generated 
and the house prices are far from their market levels. The dead weight losses equal 
the area of the red triangle and the blue trapezium. That due to the limited land being 
released for housing is the area of the red triangle, and that due to the impact of low 
FSI (and the joint impact) is the area of the trapezium.    In the UK the value losses of 
planning are on account of planning pushing for a higher density than what the 
market (given the prior development of private transport) would have picked. The 
value losses then are lower than that indicated by the smaller red triangle. 
 
 
THE HIGH COST AND UNFAIRNESS OF URBAN PLANNING IN INDIA 
 
To summarise, the impact of urban planning (including the development of master 
plans) in the current approach is the main reason for making access to urban land 
(housing) difficult for all but the rich and the upper middle classes. It is important to 
go over the arguments again. 
 
1)  Had urban land use regulations been more market friendly, i.e., resulted in 
minimum absolute scarcity rents on land (while generating rents on 
differential access to central places) then the scope for rent seeking would 
have been significantly lower. That would have reduced considerably the 
current transfers of vast values in the form of rents to politicians, builders, 
land sharks and the mafia.  
2)  Market friendliness would mean giving FSIs that are closer (or higher) than to 
what the market would have chosen. This would lower the cost of a unit of 
housing while raising the differential land on land, but lower the overall rent 
per unit of housing. 
3)  It would also make for higher density and therefore cheaper infrastructure 
especially since network economies (natural monopoly in industries like 
electricity, gas, water and sewerage distribution) imply increasing returns to 
higher density. 
4)  Additionally in areas like public transport, it makes metros socially viable. With 
feed back effects the cost of living and working declines substantially then to 
make the city efficient and therefore a growth driver.  
5)  Market friendliness does not mean that use restrictions all go away. There are 
significant negative externalities between residence and commercial activities 
on the one hand and industrial (and machinery using commercial) on the 
other, so that land use restrictions that result in the avoidance of these 
negative externalities is necessary as well.  Parks, gardens and green spaces 
are justified but then access to them has to be universal. 
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The above would imply a complete overhaul of the assumptions of urban planning in 
India.  
 
Urban planning in the pre-independence period moved from the planning and 
regulation that was largely driven by the city fathers with an overarching colonial 
framework. While it was elitist and left out vast numbers from the benefit of planning 
in the older urban habitats, the approach to urban land use and construction  in the 
new cities with their base in the colonial economy itself was more  functional and less 
value destroying. This was certainly true in cities such as Madras (Chennai), Bombay 
(Mumbai), and Calcutta (Kolkata). The role of business men who controlled the 
municipalities of these cities was instrumental in ensuring a more functional approach 
that allowed city forming functions to continue with vigour.  
 
In Delhi though in this period the ‘classic imperial’ city with the lavish dysfunctional 
Lutyens Delhi ushered in planning in India. Here the difference between the “civil 
lines” exemplified by the area north of Connaught Place and New Delhi was stark. 
While the former suffered from the complete lack of planning, and hence could not 
avoid the usual negative externalities of mixed and unregulated  land use, the latter 
in being lavish and laid to very low densities imposed large movement  and rent cost 
on the city. Only the transfer of this cost to the rest of the country allowed the city to 
grow. In the post independence period the imperial planning model of Delhi was 
picked up to design places like Chandigarh, Gandhinagar which resulted in the 
imposition of the cost of low densities and spread of the city over a much wider area 
than otherwise.  
 
When urban planning was institutionalised it was with an orthodox approach that did 
not consider the limitation of low income and need for public transport. In planning 
with low densities (in terms of built up area, i.e. low FSIs) construction was 
distributed over a large geographical area making the city spread over a larger area 
than otherwise. Lack of integration of the development plans with transport planning 
further compounded the problem to result in urban sprawls with little high speed 
corridors other than those that were already there in the pre-independence periods. 
This was especially so in the metros and the larger cities with their economic 
dynamism.  The years of urban planning under the mistaken idea that low FSIs (as 
low as 1 are infrastructure saving) has now created the problems that are most 
visible. The high prices of built up areas means that for much of the poor and the 
lower middle class very tiny hovels or entirely illegal interstices are all that are 
possible.   
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CHANGING URBAN PLANNING TO ENSURE VALUE CREATION AND EQUITY 
 
So one perhaps most important element in the fairness of land use is for wholesale 
reform and liberalisation of urban planning the elements of which are as follows: 
 
•  Staffing of urban planning offices with economists and properly trained urban 
planners. 
 
•  The integration of urban transport planning, regional planning and urban planning 
through the use of simulation models 
•  The acceptance of the constraint that no more than 20% of the cost of new built 
up housing would be land cost. 
 
•  Working with much larger FSIs would be necessary.  
 
•  In allowing larger FSIs in some areas and not in others there would be substantial 
spatial discrimination for the common good, which would have to be suitably 
compensated if the movement to higher FSIs has to be fair, and hence find 
unequivocal support 
 
•  The movement to hierarchical planning that allows easy shift of land use from a 
lower order use to a higher order use must he part of the reform. This means that 
use of land from agriculture to industry to housing and commerce must be 
automatic. Only the consideration that an entire “planning block” must be so 
considered need be a limitation on this automatic approval. The “block” for such 
consideration would be as small as a “block” straddled by streets in the case of 
the movement to commercial use.  
 
•  Mixed use of commercial and residential must be allowed except when a housing 
colony is involved. Commercial and office use in residential areas as along as 
parking and other externalities are internalised, should not normally be 
disallowed. 
 
•  The integration of transport planning with urban planning would take the layout 
away from the current circular pattern with ring roads (most antithetical to 
functional movement in central places) to radial patterns with cross links, with the 
radials being served by metros and high capacity bus /tram systems. 
 
•  The movement of current urban sprawls to the more functional pattern outlined 
above would need much land for public infrastructure including transport and 
common use facilities such as parking, water storage, markets etc. These can 
come through changes in land use, and by intelligent use of current vacant lots 
which are taken over with suitable compensation. 
 
•  The use of transfer of development rights (TDRs) can allow for acquisition for 
public use without actual financial outlays. Thus for example, if bus stops have to 
be provided for, then suitable low rise built up areas and vacant lots can be given 
TDRs and taken over, and the compensation to the owners of such properties 
can be arranged through the market value of the TDR. The market value of the 
TDR can be ensured by raising the FSI’s along transport corridors of metros and 
particularly around stations densities as high as 3 to 5, while making the use of 
such high FSI contingent on purchase of TDRs.   Such measures can rationally  
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locate the population in the city so as to reduce the cost and time of movement.  
Similarly, when cash is required for public  infrastructure development, FSIs can 
be auctioned to the highest bidder in a planned locality to mop up the potential 
value to the owner in the regulatory change
8. 
 
•  For extension of the urban area i.e. for extensive growth to bring new areas 
under the city the use of “Town Planning” (TP) rather than land acquisition would 
allow quick, easy and workable planning to take place. The practises in 
Ahmedabad are worthy of emulation in this regard. Essentially an area 
earmarked for urbanisation under the master plan is not taken over. Instead all 
the properties are shrunk by a certain proportion and re-worked on a map (with 
the angularities being reduced) but now with the public amenities –roads, parks, 
public toilets etc laid out. Contiguity is also protected in most cases. If some plots 
are too tiny to shrink they are levied charges. Others which are shrunk by more 
than the average values have higher FSIs than those which shrink less than the 
average. Similarly TDRs internal to the area can be used.  The integrated 
scheme with the planned infrastructure, the  internal settlements, the charges  etc 
are presented to the people, objections invited and settled to finally become the 
master plan.  This is an important and hassle free and fair way to extend the 
urban frontier.  When such extension is also accompanied by changes to 
planning framework as outlined above then the land rents embedded in house 
prices can come down dramatically. 
 
 
TOWARDS DEFINING “PUBLIC PURPOSE” IN USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
 
The constraint imposed by land (lack of availability, risks in purchase, use 
restrictions) constitute among the major sources of risks and delays in infrastructural 
development. Indeed, today we can say that development and equity would fall victim 
to the problems that emanate from land. Firstly, it is important to recognise that much 
of infrastructure being itself subject to market failure of the natural monopoly kind – 
the natural monopoly emanating from the network aspect (wires business both 
distribution and transmission  in electricity and telecom, pipelines in gas, oil  both 
distribution and trunk, sewerage and sanitation, drinking water, airports, ports mobile 
telephony,  city roads) would require regulation and/or state provisioning.  
 
Similarly, another kind of market failure arising out of the aspect that profit 
maximising entities would not serve the need given a lack of sufficient appropriability 
(in sectors such as city roads – due to lack of excludability, sewerage –given the 
need for complete coverage, primary education and drinking water -given the need 
for universal service, and village and hierarchically lower order roads) again 
necessitates either state ownership, mechanisms to deliver subsidies or appropriate 
                                                  
8 TDRs have been used to compensate owners of land on whom low densities have been 
imposed in order  to protect heritage sites and natural endowments in the US. Essentially the 
idea in TDRs is to unbundle development from the land to direct development in a way that 
results in overall social gains.  
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contractual arrangements of longer duration with profit maximizing entities, such as 
PPPs and PFIs. But neither of these two kinds of market failure, nor the solutions 
chosen for the same by a society,  should be confused with whether or not specific 
land is required for economic activities. It is only the need for specific land that 
justifies use of eminent domain or compulsion by the state.  
 
We may classify all activities that directly or indirectly add value to society in a 
scheme that have as their axis the two kinds of market failure to classify them into 4 
sets. Further with the consideration of whether or not they require specific land, we 
would have 8 sets as brought out in Exhibit 2. Thus only the activities in the bottom 
panel viz those which require specific land are problematic. All others can potentially 
acquire the land required through market transactions, and no eminent domain is 
justified. Yet traditionally because activities that were under natural monopoly (A2N, 
B2N, A2S and B2S) were either regulated or owned and provided by the state the 
associated land required for these activities were considered as being required under 
“public purpose”.  
 
The “term public purpose” is perhaps most ill-used. There is little clarity in its 
meaning among economists not to speak of political scientists, since most often all 
that it means is that the public (rather than some specific business) gains  in the 
purpose being served. Thus all activities with market failure as well as appropriability 
failure, (A2S and A2N)  require deep involvement of the state and till recently were 
considered as ‘public’ in the sense there could be no profit maximising here. Hence 
when the term public purpose was used in the sense of a “non-private purpose” and 
hence was justified as requiring  land,   there was some merit since most activities 
here also required specific land.  
 
Similarly when  ‘public purpose’ included activities A1N and A1S without distinction 
(since there was no way earlier to perform these through “for profit” entities) there 
seemed to be some merit in the negative definition of “not for profit” justifying the 
state making available the land for all such activities that fell in the panels A.  
However now that  PPPs (more specifically the PFI subform) allows the performance 
of many of the activities in panel 1 (where there is an appropriability problem) and for 
regulation to allow the performance of activities in panel A by profit maximising 
entities, the term “public purpose” being understood in the negative sense as not 
being for profit is problematic.  In other words there is a need today to distinguish 
between ownership and the nature of the activities.  Actually, all economic (including 
protective and coordinating) activities can be considered as serving the public even if  
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profits are made by entities. After all the capitalist system can be understood as 
being socially desirable only because profit maximising leads to social value 
maximising in nearly all areas other than those with market failure.  
 
Since panel B constitutes the bulk of activities of society and are amenable to being 
provided by profit maximising entities (with regulation in the case of B2S and B2N) 
the negative definition of public purpose as “not private” made sense. When today 
the boundary between B and  A changes with technology and developments in the 
law,  in contracting and procurement, then the negative definition is no longer 
adequate.  Thus when roads are constructed by the private sector under PFIs then 
the public purpose as earlier understood is of little use in the decision of whether 
eminent domain is to used or otherwise.  We contend that the core reason for the use 
of eminent domain is when specific land is required. Thus it would involve all 
activities in the panel S but not those in panel N  since these would not normally 
require specific land.  Thus a government owned enterprise setting up a steel plant 
wanting land would not qualify for use of eminent domain for land just as much as a 
private steel mill would not. Similarly both government or a private a road builder 
would have to be supported by use of eminent domain.  
 
For India today private provisioning or provisioning by profit maximising entities is 
vital for the development of infrastructure. That means that the link between state 
ownership and provisioning of public infrastructure as such is not the criteria for use 
of eminent domain.  Therefore any difference in the acquisition of land either in terms 
of price paid or the process gone through that is derived from the ownership of the 
facility is not justified merely on account of whether the activity is performed by the 
government or a private party.  
 
The implications of the above discussion are quite clear. “Public purpose”  has to be 
defined in terms of specific use, and  where the land is required for network 
industries, and eminent domain restricted has to be the same. The Amendment Bill 
does go forward in this regard to specify the kind of uses for which eminent domain 
could apply but does not constrain nor provide the logic. More importantly the well 
recognised principle, valid in all democracies and even in societies where contracts 
(social and economic) are expected to be functional is that when eminent domain 
(compulsion is used) the valuation has to be necessarily done by a third party to 
avoid any conflict of interest is absent in the proposed amendment.   
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IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN THE LAND ACQUISITION AMENDMENT BILL 
 
The Amendment Bill was itself informed by our earlier work so all that we can do in 
terms of fairness in acquisition is to repeat some of our submissions to the 
parliamentary committee, that examines the Bill. 
 
Sections 5 (v) (vi) concern the specification of public purpose in the Amendment Bill. 
An attempt is made to define public purpose. Keeping companies out of eminent 
domain in land acquisition (compulsory land acquisition) is  a positive proposal. But 
that should not mean that PPPs are excluded.  The use of the term “controlled by the 
state needs” to be removed since there are various options under which this can be 
used by governments to procure land for commercial and other uses on behalf of 
commercial /vested interests. Moreover controlled by the state is a nebulous 
category unless it is defined as effective ownership of more than 50%. 
 
More fundamentally the definition  of public purpose in the Amendment  is in terms of 
activities. Rather it should be in terms of the specificity of the land required. Eminent 
domain should be used only in case where the land required is specific. This has 
been argued in our earlier submission to the government and in Morris and Pandey 
(2007, 2007a).  Thus a clause that the government / authority should show why the 
land identified for compulsory acquisition is the best land/ only land suitable for the 
purpose  should be incorporated as part of the defining section on public purpose. 
 
Private parties, companies and  others wanting to use land for commercial purposes 
do come in (in the Bill) despite the exclusion otherwise, when they have already 
acquired 70% of the land they would like to acquire. This provision is to avoid the 
hold out problem. This is a valuable provision. Nevertheless the same needs to be 
stated better. Actually there  needs to be in place a registry which is maintained by 
the state government. A private party [or government requiring land] wishing to buy 
land (and where specific land is not required and hence no “public purpose” (in the 
sense described) is operative, can register ex-ante, describing the area (with survey 
numbers aggregating to a contiguous parcel) that it seeks to acquire.  
 
It can then go ahead with purchase and in case he is subject to the hold out problem 
it can evoke the provisions of this section of the law to acquire the residual 30% (or 
less) provided he has already acquired (purchased) 70% by both title numbers  and 
the proportion of the area originally entered in the registry. The operative price 
payable would have to be the highest price paid to any of the parties, for any of the 
parcels which would apply to all that now that is being acquired through eminent  
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domain Without an ex-ante registration no such use of eminent domain should be 
allowed. The registration would put the community of landowners potentially 
considering sale, in an appropriate bargaining position with the buyer.  The buyer too 
in  having other options (which also could chose to register ex-ante) in other parcels 
(since no specific land is required) is in an appropriate position to negotiate, so the 
negotiation has a high probability of success, and hence the hold out problem can be 
considerably reduced.  The proposal here is akin to the open offer of an acquirer 
protecting the interest of minority shareholders in corporate acquisitions.  
 
Unfortunately the Amendment is not clear with the detail and so has been rightly 
opposed by politicians concerned with the people’s interest in an immediate and 
obvious sort of way.  When applied in rural areas, since there is bargaining involved 
in the sale, rehabilitation is not required since the community always has the choice 
of rejecting the offer. The fact that the 70% has to be in terms of both title and area 
would ensure the same since a few large landowners could then not connive with the 
buyer to cheat the other sellers. In rural  areas the additional provision that the 
Village Panchayat (PRI) would be involved to protect the interest of those who are 
not landowners but depend upon the earlier economic activity based on land would 
have to be incorporated. This can be ensured by laying down the provision that   
when acquisition of an area larger than a third the average size of a village in the 
locality is involved then all displaced persons would be part of the community that 
negotiates. 
 
In Section 5 (vii) the replacement of the court by the Authority at the central and state 
levels is an attempt to bypass courts in the face of  delays and pile up of cases at 
courts, with the object of speedy takeover and award of compensation. Yet in this 
provision justice and governance may be compromised, and may actually lead to 
further delays in the long run besides increased contest and litigation. The Authority 
is not independent (if the details of who can be appointed are recognized) of the 
executive and is yet given judicial powers. The Authority is better appointed by the 
high court since being in the nature of an appeals court against the decision of the 
government / collector it must have the independence of the executive of the 
government. Even if appointment  is by the government using retired civil servants 
(including retired civil servants) and barring other experts – see 17A (5) and judges / 
retired judges is a bad idea since the authority has to grapple with tricky questions of 
valuation which requires economics, the expertise of professional valuers. It is also  
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important that the Authority can and behave independently both of which would be 
compromised.  
 
Actually it is far better to rework the Authority as a referral body in the rare case of 
dispute relating to public purpose and to valuation arises. With  such design of the 
valuation process  very few cases would actually come up to the Authority . This 
would mean making the Authority completely independent of government in staffing 
and being driven by the judiciary rather than by the government, and simultaneously 
re-working the section on valuation – determining the market valuation of the land 
which we consider below. 
 
Section 13 lays out the criteria for valuation of land in compulsory acquisition. The 
criteria for valuation by the collector is an improvement over the previous Act, but not 
a substantial one because it is still perverse in process and is likely to contested in 
almost every case, thereby making the Amendment Act as vulnerable to litigation as 
the Act it proposes to change. The valuation process is perverse since the principle is 
the absurd one  of “I (government) cut(s) the cake and I decide on which piece you 
(land owner) will have”.   All eminent domain based land acquisition  in democracies 
have the institution of independent valuation by licensed professional independent 
valuers. In India this science of land valuation is conspicuous by its absence, since 
primary value is highly influenced by administrative and ad-hoc land use restraints, 
and the valuation in acquisition is  administratively driven. Even in the case where 
government or compulsory acquisition is not involved, besides location and the usual 
hedonistic variables, there is a very large role played by the regulatory aspect and 
ad-hoc decisions of the government to determine / change land use.  
 
Section 11B (i) and (ii) needs to be replaced by : “The valuation of the land and the 
assets / resources/ implicit rights on the land such as water rights established 
through use /traditionally shall be valued by professional licensed valuers of 
properties using the various principles and methods that these professional bodies 
have established and use from time to time. If the first appointed valuers’ value is not 
accepted by the landowners the valuation of a second professional valuer would be 
appointed whose valuation would be accepted and ruled as final by the collector / 
government. Acquirees would continue to have the right of appeal on both the 
purpose of acquisition and the valuation with the Authority.” 
 
It is important that a method of valuation without reference to the specific situation 
and the economic situation cannot be laid out.  In 11B(iii) the word “average” should  
   
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
W.P.  No.  2010-03-02  Page No. 16 
be replaced by the maximum. This is necessary to prevent gaming / exploitation of 
uninformed farmers / persons giving up land to private parties, as well as to avoid the 
hold out problem. With these changes  many portions such as valuation of standing 
crops etc become redundant. 
 
It is also important to recognise other aspects not addressed by the proposed 
Amendment Bill.  Prior land use restrictions such as the requirement of NAC (Non 
Agricultural Use Clearance) which are subsequently granted / assumed after the 
acquisition/sale greatly depress the market prices prior to acquisition / sale in relation 
to the value post acquisition/sale. All such restrictions which distort markets should 
be removed. Since such provision cannot be incorporated in a law on land acquisition 
the following insertion in the section of valuation 11 A /B would be appropriate. 
“Professional valuers  have to recognize the increase in value that results from the 
government changing the land use (including prior regulatory constraint on use which 
are removed)  and the new assignment of land explicitly carried out  after  / or along 
with acquisition. In this regard the overall purpose of the entire acquisition rather than 
the acquisition of the particular land would have to be considered. In all cases of  
land required for urbanization, such land use would be deemed for either housing or  
commercial.  Such increase should be assessed by the valuer as arising out of 
regulatory changes and not on account of proposed investments on the land post 
acquisition and no less than 40 % of the increase should recognized in the valuation 





Rehabilitation has been the bugbear of the Indian state hurting among the poorest of 
its citizens since there is fundamentally no protection offered to citizens affected by 
compulsory land acquisition.  The new bill on Rehabilitation and Resettlement which 
has been passed by the Lok Sabha is in the right direction, Nevertheless 
amendments requiring the government to commit to the provisions instead of leaving 
the same to the will of the government of the day is important. Explicit recognition 
that all development will be pareto optimal on those suffering displacement could 
have been the guiding principle in this Act. 
 
 
OTHER DISTORTIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF TITLE 
 
Other distortions emanating from the taxation, title insecurity, and land use 
restrictions are similarly very large and adversely affects easy and fair use of land for  
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development. Thus high transaction taxes kill the market itself since trades would be 
few relative to final use purchase. But  intermediate trade and aggregation would only 
be possible to a mafia or those in the business since they alone would have the basis 
(having incurred the fixed costs, and having a “strong arm” to ensure enforcement) of 
transacting through sale agreements  rather than actual change in title, and enforce 
the same while avoiding taxes.  
 
Similarly the clarity with regard to title is a very serious problem. Indeed so large is 
the problem that   a “title insurance market” cannot exist in India. Clearly post haste 
government should create the basis to have firm titles in land. The first task is really 
to merge the offices that record sale deeds and keeps title documents, and to change 
the title deed format so that all hypothecations and sale agreements are entered on 
the title itself
7. This would involve moving to the Torrens system of record and map 
keeping. In the Indian case the survey numbers (with their plot maps that accompany 
sale deed/ title documents) would have to be made to cohere with the actual ground 
survey maps – cadastral maps. This can be aided greatly by computerisation. The 
integration of both title and sale deeds/ agreements to sale is very important and 
without that computerisation would only compound the mess, as has happened in 
some of the states which actively pursued computerisation for its own sake
9.   
 
Today title “arbitrage” has been responsible for giving very high values to lands sold 
by governments since therein the title is clear.  Lack of clear title is another reason 
why even when in the few cases compensation is adequate and generous, there is 
problem in actually identifying the small holder and ensuring that the same reaches 
him and is not intercepted by others.  It can of course greatly smoothen the market 
processes to give value especially to the small holder, the individual and the poor, 
and also reduce the risks in development. Most importantly a large part of the risks in 
renting out built up space arises from the title risk as well as the due to the quixotic  
rent control act which ensures that nobody and certainly not the small and individual 
householder would rent out. Mercifully many of the states are now beginning to give 
up rent control.  
  
SQUATTING CAN BE OVERCOME ONLY BY BEING FAIR 
 
Another serious problem faced by governments especially municipalities in the 
context of providing urban services and toning up city infrastructure is the problem of 
squatters.   Squatting has been created for various reasons. While in late 
                                                  
9 Ramanathan , Swati (2009)  
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industrialising societies some squatting would always be there, the ubiquitousness  of 
the phenomenon especially in the larger cities in India is entirely due to the planning 
process that generates vast rents on land to make housing very expensive for all but 
the rich, and therefore forcing the poor to squat. In the larger metros those living 
illegally in slums, on footpaths etc could easily number more than third of the 
population. The actual areas that they occupy in relation to the total areas are quite 
small so that in the movement to efficient, rational and pragmatic planning as 
described above much of the squatting problem can be overcome.  
 
Thus higher FSI can be bid out to builders with the bids being based on the total 
amount of built up space per unit of FSI that they are willing to give back to the 
government, which the government can use to accommodate the poor.  Similarly the 
bids can be based on the value they are willing to give to the TDRs they buy from the 
market, the TDRs being assigned to slum dwellers clearing out of slums, when such 
slum lands are vital for infrastructure (airport, rail expansion for instance). Many 
roads including arterial roads in Indian metros have been given up to hawkers and 
squatters. Neither an insistence that they all clear out since the property belongs to 
the state nor a tolerance for the same would work. To unclog these roads alternatives 
would have to be provided through redesign of markets, specified squatting rights, 
and allocation of market rights by the time of the day, besides relocation. Pragmatism 
and fairness is the key, not the abstract legality emergent out of the law and a 
process of planning that may itself have not been fair. 
 
STANDARDS NEED TO BE PRAGMATIC 
 
Similarly building standards can often make legal housing quite impossible or 
unnecessarily expensive. Thus most cities which have building norms that insist that 
every unit leaves space from the boundary could leave the land owner with built up 
foot print so small that it is not be worth constructing when the plot size is small.  Or it 
would force upon him a merger with neighbours. FSI norms  with construction being 
possible only some distance from roads is all that is required. An inner boundary 
should provide the opportunity to share with the neighbour a wall to avoid costs. 
These approaches are quite common elsewhere in the world
10.  In other words most 





                                                  
10 Morris, Sebastian (2001)  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
To conclude therefore we would think that in being fair (and only in being fair) is 
development and especially infrastructural development possible in any society in the 
long run. That is because there has to legitimacy to actions of the government even 
when not a democracy. Since India is a democracy it is almost axiomatic that 
fairness is necessary.  This is true also of contracts and business deals, where all 
parties to a deal have to gain if the endogenous risks have to be minimised.  With 
regard to land the following are most crucial 
 
Removing all the regulatory constraints on land which artificially affect the prior 
values. Most notable of these would be removing the need for NAC and removing the 
bar on non-agriculturalists from procuring land.  Similarly all urban planning based 
restrictions that do not emanate from a proper publicly whetted and well announced 
plan should go. Building rules too need considerable liberalisation.  Even such 
restrictions when imposed should be suitably compensated since they amount to 
‘regulatory takings’ as is now understood by town planners. 
 
The process of urban planning needs to become far more liberal, market friendly, 
truly involve the people, and the rents generated in planning should be minimised.  
No scarcity rent at all, at the periphery of the urban place is justified. Transparency to 
the process of master plan development is one key. Another would be bring in 
economics (especially the economics of land use) into the planning process. All plans 
should be simulated to check that they are the most optimal. Linkage of such urban 
planning with transport planning and provision of public infrastructure is essential. 
There are interesting methods to ensure that such planning and the provision of 
infrastructure is to a large extent self financing.  
 
Urban planning can be greatly aided when the method of Town Planning – land 
aggregation and shrinkage without change in title is resorted to. Additionally the 
usage of offsets and payments through instruments such as TDRs have high 
potential to increase the fairness and the acceptance and value creation aspects. 
 
Methods similar to TP have the potential to relax the constraints due to “ribbon 
development” along India’s highways to be able to very quickly develop them into 
corridors by widening the highways and providing link roads which also minimises the 
need for formal acquisition. It has potential for slum clearance too. 
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Above all the LAQ Act must change. While the Amendment is in the right direction 
there are important changes that would have to brought in. These relate to 
independent valuation,  and improvements in the provisions for private acquisition of 
land. 
 
Distortionary taxes and constraints on rents would have to go.  
 
 
Similarly major change in the system of maintaining title records by movement to the 
Torrens system is necessary.  
 
Additionally since the business of real estate and land valuation is still in its infancy in 
India, governments role (especially of the central government ) in aiding the creation 
of intellectual capital to this important aspect of business and life is important, since 
otherwise the reform itself is likely to be hijacked by vested interests who have 
gained enormously through the administrative and ad-hoc process of determining 
land use, acquiring land and granting/allocating land. 
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Exhibit: When Planners Impose Restrictions
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Does not require specific land 
B1N: Normal mfg., trading, 
agriculture,  DTH TV, 
scrambled radio, generation 
under markets, electricity 
supply,  
A1N: Primary education, solid 
waste collection,  broadcast 
TV and radio, higher 
education in poor countries, 
temples and worship, 
A2N: Very few activities here 
Defence, public policing, law 
and order, justice 
B2N: Very few activities here, 
mobile telephony,  




















































Does  require specific land 
B1S: Mining, prospecting, 
hydro generation,    
A1S: Bus stops, public toilets 
in cities, solid waste disposal  
A2S: Sewerage systems, and 
water supply (in poor 
countries), city roads, smaller 
roads, smaller airports  
B2S:Sewerage and water 
supply in rich countries, 
electricity distribution and 
transmission, telecom, 
pipelines (gas and oil), cable 
TV, railways, arterial roads, 
ports and airports (large), 
bridges 
Exhibit 2: A Framework to Understand Public Purpose  